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REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH OF RELIGION
Louis Dupre

Is it possible to reflect on religious truth from a position outside faith without seriously
distorting what faith itself understands by its truth? As long as philosophy and theology
remained united-until the end of the middle ages-such a reflection was neither needed
nor attempted. The standpoint which an independent philosophy in the modem age has
taken with respect to the problem of truth, where the knowing subject becomes the source
of truth, would appear to render such an effort suspect. Nevertheless, this essay argues,
we are justified in approaching the truth of religion through the models available in present
philosophy: correspondence, coherence, disclosure. In all three cases, however, the
application of the models needs to be qualified if it is to account for truth as faith itself
understands it.

If one thing distinguishes traditional religious conceptions of truth from modem
philosophical ones, it is the absence, or secondary role, of epistemological
concerns. Despite their substantial differences, all religious traditions agree in
stressing the ontological and moral qualities of truth over the purely cognitive
ones. Truth refers to being, rather than to knowledge. In Sanskrit, the mother
tongue of our Indo-European languages, truth is satya while being is sat. Gandhi
based his life-long quest for what he called truth upon this identity. In 1932 he
formulated as follows:

"Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why Sat or Truth
is perhaps the more important name of God. In fact, it is more correct to
say that 'Truth is God' than to say that 'God is Truth' .'"
The proper attitude with respect to this ontological truth consists in the first place
in devotion and fidelity: the path of truth is the path of devotion (bhakti)-the only
path that leads to God. 2 In a religious vision of this nature lies, I believe, the origin of the so-called correspondence theory which later became so exclusively
cognitive: the consistency between what is and one's conduct. Not to be "true" to
one's self means, in fact, to descend to a lesser mode of being. Only when we are
fully connected with Being shall we be able to know. The relation here is exactly
the opposite of modem thought which starts from the primacy of consciousness. 3
The nature of religious truth consists in the first place in an ontological state
whereby the relation to God defines the definitive link with Being. That relation
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also secures access to the source of ultimate meaning. All "true" knowing depends
on a being in the truth. But the transcendent pole of the relation establishes
man's awareness of the relation as well as the relation itself. Truth in religion
implies more than merely admitting that an ontological bond with God exists.
The recognition of that bond must itself be given. Truth then consists in the
right relation to the ultimately real and only that transcendent reality can enlighten
us concerning the nature and even the existence of that relation. This principle
summarizes the fundamental belief about truth not only in the Judaeo-Christian
tradition but, if I am not mistaken, in all others as well. It marks the constant
factor in religious truth. Our own tradition stands out by its increasing emphasis
upon the second aspect-the need for a divine disclosure, a revelation.
General Considerations
If religion by its own account provides the basis of its own truth, can we move
to a basis outside the domain of faith and yet hope fairly to evaluate that truth?
Can faith accept any judgment critical of its truth that originates in an autonomous
philosophy independently of the principles of faith itself? Can any statement be
made about the truth of religion that does not coincide with the truth in religion
itself without undoing or seriously distorting the latter? This much seems certain.
A critical examination that on the basis of pure reason, independently of the
religious experience proper, attempts to establish or disestablish "the truth of
religion," must indeed result in distortion. Since modem philosophical theories
of truth were developed mainly for the purpose of securing a foundation for
scientific practice, this may appear to render them unfit for evaluating the specific
nature of religious truth. Yet such a conclusion would be premature and, we
hope to show, in the end unjustified. The basic models of truth used in those
theories predate the scientific concerns of the modem age. They may, in fact,
have grown out of a religious soil. Such was, almost certainly, the case with
the disclosure model. But truth as correspondence and coherence were also
formulated well before their modem methodic investigation started. Clearly,
philosophy has developed these ancient models of truth on the basis of careful
(albeit often unduly limited) analyses of the cognitive act. To compare religious
claims to those models by no means commits one to the antitheological assumptions which often accompany their appearance in modem philosophy. But neither
do we propose to "justify" religious truth in the light of that philosophy. Unless
one assumes the basic legitimacy of the religious act on its own merits, attempts
toward an all-comprehensive justification inevitably fail. Truth, as Spinoza
taught, must prove itself: one cannot prove it to be true by another "truth" which
presumably stands outside it.
The following argument presupposes the existence of a truth proper to religion.
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In comparing it with the existing models of truth we merely intend to investigate
the aptitude of these models in clarifying that religious fact as well as the particular
conditions required for successfully doing so. In a sense, then, it is philosophy,
or at least its available apparatus, rather than religion, that is being examined
here. To be sure, if the concept of religious truth proved to be radically incompatible with any of the existing models, the critical believer would have serious
grounds for questioning the "truth of religion." For a comprehensive theory of
truth, must, in principle, be able to adjudicate all legitimate claims of truth. If
recent philosophy has often rejected the legitimacy of religious claims, the application of the basic models, rather than the models themselves may be at fault.
If, however, the religious concept of truth were to prove intractably resistant to
any integration with other concepts of truth (such as the scientific ones) within
the existing models, this would create a serious problem in the religious truth
claims themselves. All the more so since these models originated long before
any positivist restrictions were attached to it. Even though religion unfolds its
own truth, it is forced to do so within the available categories of general discourse.
Revelation itself cannot be rendered intelligible unless it still proves capable of
being assumed within the modern pattern of speaking and thinking. However
sublime and unique, a message confronts the elementary fact that, in order to
be expressed, it must adopt an existing language and thereby integrate itself
within a praxis of discourse.
Western philosophy since its Greek origins has held truth to consist in an ideal
presence, an objective quality that transcends the subjective experience of certainty.
Only since the last century have philosophers begun to question this traditional
position. Today certain psychological, sociological, or linguistic theories tend to
reduce adherence to a particular epistemic position to unacknowledged factors in
the individual or in the group to which the individual belongs. "Truth," in this
view, would be attained by deconstructing the obvious surface structure and by
gathering information about the building stones presumed to have been used in its
construction. Obviously within such a perspective religion is apriori banned from
presenting any truth claims at all. Since truth as demystification or deconstruction
either begs the question of truth altogether or rests upon a more fundamental
model to which it merely clears the access, we shall not consider it here. 4
A. Correspondence

The correspondence between word and reality appears even in the earliest
tradition, if not as the central core of religious truth, at least as one of its essential
components. Truth, also religious truth, requires that our words or concepts
conform to things as they are in themselves. Philosophy, after it took the critical
epistemic turn, found nothing but insoluble problems in such a neat division
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between a purely "mental" concept and a purely "real" object. Precisely the
invincible difficulties inherent in the unproven assumption of a harmony between
the mind and the world led to Kant's radical reversal of the correspondence
theory. After his "Copernican revolution" the line that distinguishes the correspondence from the coherence theory becomes hard to draw. Thus Edmund
Husserl in his basically Kantian Logical Investigations asserts about the relation
between ideas and things:
"The connection ofthings, to which the thought-experiences (Denkerlebnisse}--the real or the possible-are intentionally related, and, on the
other hand, the connection of truths, in which the unity of things (die
sachliche Einheit) comes to objective validity as that which it is-both
are given together and cannot be separated from each other. "5
The famous "things themselves" (die Sachen selbst) to which Husserl intends to
return philosophy, prove then to be as ideal as the relations of consciousness.
They constitute the invariable element in the mind's perspective variations. The
very notion of intentionality-the relation between the mind and its object-is
reinterpreted into one of immanent objectivity: the object belongs to the act of
consciousness itself. It is constituted not independently of that act, but with and
through it, yet with an immanent independence of the experience of the object.
The intuition of truth in the end then is the outcome of a process in which we
bring the object to givenness. A thing is given when it is brought to ideal
presence. Clearly, in such an immanent interpretation the distinction between a
theory of "correspondence" and one of coherence approaches the vanishing point.
Even without following the Kantian reinterpretation to its idealist extremes
we cannot but regard the appeal to "the facts" which some contemporary critics
of religion continue to make, as patently uncritical. No facts are perceivable
without a screen of interpretation that converts data into objects or facts. To
perceive a complex of data as a fact always includes seeing them through an
interpretation. Now in the case of religion which deals with the ultimate structure
of the real itself, interpretation plays a particularly significant and inevitably
controversial part. It is quite common for two people confronted with the same
state of affairs to see it as religious or as non-religious and to do so without in
the least contradicting each other on the relevant observable data. Both may
agree on the basic interpretation, but one may feel the need for a further interpretation which the other rejects or considers unnecessary. On a practical and on a
limited theoretical level believers and unbelievers interpret the world in a manner
so similar that they may intimately collaborate with one another on social or
scientific projects without ever having to resolve major differences of interpretation. Basic, partial interpretations suffice for practical, scientific work, and even
for a general cultural exchange. Nevertheless, the all-comprehensive, religious
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interpretations shed a different light on all aspects of the real. To those who
hold them they have the deepest impact upon emotional, ethical, and even
motivational attitudes.
A philosophical evaluation of the "truth of religion" on the basis of a correspondence theory of truth, then, requires taking into account not only the legitimacy of separate levels of interpretation but, in addition, the possible conflict
of an interpretation made on a basic level with those made on other levels.
Nevertheless, there are solid reasons for continuing to speak of correspondence
with respect to religious truth even in philosophical discourse. For truth in religion
always presents itself as a relatedness to what ultimately is: a conversion, both
moral and ontological, toward Being as it is in its very roots and origins, contrary
to appearance and deception. The possible discrepancy between one and the
other, as well as the process required to reach the state of total correspondence,
suggest the existence of a separation between the mind and that ultimate reality
which religious truth claims to bridge. Moreover, the "truth" thus attained is
presented as revealed, that is, given to the mind from a principle or level of
being that surpasses the mind's own reality. Here again the process of truth
overcomes an initial duality between the mind and the "inner word" of revelation.
It is worth noting that both these elements belong to the ideal realm (the only
locus of truth since Kant) and hence that the correspondence theory thus applied
to religious truth is not the naive-realistic one, but the modem critical one.
B. Coherence

Today most truth theories, implicitly or explicitly, refer to coherence. This is
particularly the case with religious truth. Many who had become disheartened
about the prospect of religious truth filling the demands for empiric~l verification
advanced by positivists and empiricists, saw in the new forms of the coherence
theory an escape from their troubles. Linguistic theories such as that found in
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations would legitimate any discourse in
its own right, independently of others, provided it consistently apply the rules
it set itself. Undoubtedly the coherence theory has protected the realm of religious
meaning against undue intrusions of other realms. Each particular system, each
"significant whole" as Harold Joachim defined it in his classical The Nature of
Truth, obeys laws of its own that differ from those of other significant wholes. 6
An internal articulation organically integrates the separate elements into a unity
of meaning. In the case of religion such a recognition of a relative autonomy
becomes particularly important since it dispenses us from applying criteria derived
from those epistemic conditions that determine purely objective knowledge.
Yet the theory as developed in modem epistemology requires several qualifications if it is to relate to what we have traditionally understood as religious
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truth, or even to accomplish the more modest goal of justifying the meaningfulness
of religious discourse. Coherence easily turns into closedness. To make genuine
truth claims a system must be coherent not only within itself, but also with other
systems. This requires at the very least that principles inherent in what we have
called "basic" interpretations of experience do not contradict those implicit in a
"higher" or more remote system of interpretation where religious truth places its
stake. Recent debates on religious truth tend to neglect this point. To prove that
the discourses of religion and of physics substantially differ is not sufficient to
exclude apriori any possible conflict. That religion has staked out its own realm
of discourse does not dispense it from having to enter into dialogue with other
realms and to render its claims compatible with the "basic" interpretations of
common sense and the physical sciences. Even the principles of falsifiability
and verifiability that rule these interpretations should not be immediately dismissed as not applying to this "higher" realm. In withdrawing religious truth
from universal criteria of meaning we rescue it from outside criticism only to
drown it in total meaninglessness.
If truth in religion did not share some basic assumptions with other areas of
truth, the term "truth" as we understand it today would cease to preserve any
meaning at all. Religious truth, while being distinct, nevertheless relates to all
aspects of life. Philosophical reflection tolerates neither unmediated pluralism
nor epistemic relativism, as if one system of truth could remain totally unrelated
to another. 7 Closing religious doctrines off from other realms of thought may in
the end create worse problems than open conflicts with them. Precisely the failure
to harmonize those doctrines with the scientific world view has rendered religion
so improbable to many of our educated contemporaries as not to deserve any
serious consideration. C. D. Broad while agreeing with the claim that nothing
in modem science "refutes" the belief in miracles and in an afterlife, nevertheless
dismissed it for being totally out of tune with the world picture of science:
" ... there is literally nothing but a few pinches of philosophical fluff to be put
in the opposite scale to this vast coherent mass of ascertained facts."8 A preposterous conclusion, but one made possible by the increasing "hermetisation" of
religious discourse. To avoid the problems of modem culture believers tend to
compartmentalize their world view. Facing social, psychological, and scientific
developments which they feel incapable of integrating with their faith they disconnect their unexamined religious beliefs from the rest of their convictions, as
an island of truth isolated from the mainland of modem culture. Yet the believer
should know that these convictions on a basic level draw a line of probability
beyond which even the most hallowed "revelation" becomes rationally inadmissible. Rather than outright rejecting the validity of the principle of falsifiability
in religious truth believers should question the one-sided manner in which the
positivist usually applies it. They may rightly refuse to accept criteria that fail
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to account for the specific quality of religious beliefs. But they should at least
admit the fact, supported by daily apostasies, that faith is in principle falsifiable
and that the limits of probability, however different from one person to another,
cannot be stretched indefinitely.
Taken by itself the theory of coherence proves equally insufficient to account
for the most characteristic quality of religious truth, namely, that it originates
outside the system. A brief glance at the theory's most popular current representative should illustrate this. Reexamining the relation between the objective world
and the discourse which signifies that world, structuralism concludes that a
system of discourse filters each new perception through a pre-established, self-sufficient network allowing to emerge only so much as the system is able to handle.
Decisive for the appearance of objects at any given time is, in the words of
Michel Foucault, "the interplay of the rules."" Such a self-sufficient, self-referential structure excludes the world of objects or, for that matter, any other system.
All assertions refer to the established communal meaning. This is not the place
to enter into the different varieties of structuralist theories. But their general
tendency to have social, mostly linguistic, structures, determine thought, restricts
truth to a social, linguistic problem. A consistent structuralist system, if I understand it correctly, tolerates no intrusion from beyond, indeed, no genuine novelty.
Since the context alone must account for any possible appearance, the form of
new phenomena was already apriori implied in the structure itself. Not to admit
genuine difference is, of course, fatal to any idea of religious truth which implies
a transcendent revelation. Precisely because he perceived the inability of a closed
structuralism to admit genuine novelty, Derrida developed a theory of language
that would allow him to move beyond the intrinsic socio-linguistic limitations.
His philosophy of the creative word breaking through the given, whereby the
signifier transcends the signified, appears, paradoxically, to reopen the way to
a religious transcendence. 10
Having expressed these objections against the potential of the coherence theory
to serve as exclusive model for a philosophical evaluation of religious truth, we
must nevertheless admit its unique appropriateness for legitimating the relative
autonomy and distinct identity of religious discourse. Our objections bear only
on the sufficiency of a closed theory of coherence for the purpose of justifying
the characteristic truth of such a discourse.
C. Disclosure
The correspondence and coherence models remain indispensable for understanding the truth of religion. But the more they came to reflect the subjective
tum of modem thought, the more they became removed from what religion itself
has traditionally understood to be the essence of its truth. We saw how hard it
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becomes to accommodate the idea of revelation in theories for which the sole
source of equation or of coherence is the human subject. The disclosure theory
appears less tainted by modem subjectivism and therefore better suited to recognize the specific nature of religious truth. In recent discussions that theory has
moved once again to the front stage of the philosophical scene. But its origins
lie hidden in the beginnings of Western thought. We find it in Plato and Plotinus,
of course, but, before them, already in Parmenides's famous poem and, even
earlier, in the dark recesses of Greek myth. In its modem form it reasserts the
priority of ontological over epistemic truth. "Truth," Heidegger states, does not
possess its original seat in the proposition but in a disclosure "through which an
openness essentially unfolds." Allowing things to be, to disclose themselves in
the open, is the very essence of freedom. Though the essence of truth lies in
freedom, its focus is not on the subject, but to the openness within which Being
itself appears. 11
Such a theory definitely moves closer to the essence of religious truth. Indeed,
its origin is clearly religious. But here, the problem presents itself rather from
the opposite angle. How will a theory so obviously dependent upon the traditional
idea of illumination meet the modem critical demand that truth justify itself.
Until it does, disclosure may be the concept in which religion views its own
truth, but philosophy will resist accepting it as the truth of religion. Since the
days of Heidegger and Marcel, however, hermeneutic philosophy has gone a
long way in attempting to justify the disclosure theory, not, to be sure, by means
of the critical method (which would soon reduce disclosure to a subjective
source), but by a careful analysis of modes of cognition which illuminate Being
without being restricted by the epistemic criteria of the positive sciences. Thus,
the aesthetic and the historical consciousness attain truth in a manner which
surpasses the subordinate moments of historical accuracy and of the aesthetic
"imitation of nature." Obviously, to apply here the critical norms used in establishing the foundations of the positive sciences constitutes an ineffective attempt
to transfer the truth proper to one domain into a different one. Gadamer clearly
defined the issue: "Our task demands that we recognize in it an experience of
truth which must not only be critically justified, but which itself is a mode of
philosophizing."12 "Critical" justification (the term itself is misleading in this
context!) here consists in a particular "mode of philosophizing," a retracing in
actu reflecto of what we are actually doing in actu exercito, rather than in
establishing the kind of critical foundation which philosophy provides for the
sciences. The purpose ofthis immanent reflection is to uncover the light it sheds
on Being and on human existence within Being. The real test of the disclosure
consists in establishing its ontological significance. This, according to Gadamer
(in the third part of Truth and Method), occurs in a fundamental reflection on
language.
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In his discussion of the image Gadamer refers to the ontological quality of
the iconic symbol by the term Seinszuwachs-augmentation of Being. However
one may judge this usage, the term eminently applies to the truth disclosed in
religious symbols and, in the ludaeo-Christian tradition, that means in the first
place, religious language. Precisely in this ontological nature of the religious
disclosure resides its characteristic truth. This, I believe, is ultimately what Hegel
had in mind when he declared the Christian religion to be essentially "true"-that
is, expressing the deepest dimension of Being. "[Christian doctrine is not merely
something subjective but is also an absolute, objective content that is in and for
itself, and has the characteristic of truth. "13 Rather than submitting this disclosure
to antecedent philosophical criteria, Hegel subordinates this critical awareness
itself to what he considers the prior, religious disclosure. "[The standpoint of
religion] is the affirmation that the truth with which consciousness is actively
related embraces all content within itself. Hence this relation of consciousness
to this truth is itself the highest level of consciousness, its absolute standpoint. "14
The absoluteness of religious truth lies in the fact that its disclosure includes all
reality without having to refer to any reality outside itself, and that it implies its
own necessity. 15
But then Hegel adds that the truth of religion is fully disclosed only when
religion itself loses its representational form and becomes philosophy. The justification of religious truth-which formerly had mostly consisted in the critical

reflection upon an already established truth-now constitutes itself as truth.
Hence the disclosure of religious truth is no longer completed within faith itself.
At this point we may wonder whether Hegel is not withdrawing with one hand
what he had given with the other. Nevertheless, in reclaiming ontological ultimacy
for religious disclosure Hegel supports the position of the mystics who, almost
unanimously, assert that religious disclosure contains an ontological richness
unparalleled by any other mode of truth.
Theologians and many philosophers were quick in appropriating the disclosure
theory for their explanation of religious truth. Understandably so, since they felt
they were merely returning an indigenous idea to its original habitat. Religious
symbols undoubtedly disclose a unique fullness of Being. Of course, philosophers
still found themselves stranded with the arduous task of justifying this ontological
manifestation without appealing directly to a supernatural revelation. Many chose
to ignore this difficult issue and were satisfied with describing the unique disclosure that takes place in the religious act. One need not decide on the natural or
supernatural origin, they felt, in order to see in the religious act an illumination
within which all previous contents and relations come to stand in a new light.
Even as we suddenly perceive a picture that, without any change in the configuration, totally transforms a mere complex of lines and colors, so a religious
disclosure conveys to ordinary reality a symbolic and metaphorical quality. But
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does such a description philosophically legitimate the religious act? How does
the ontological disclosure justify the specific beliefs and rules that provided the
occasion for it? I have already indicated how the traditional requirements of
verification and falsification in a general way also apply to religion. For the
religious believer, the ontological disclosure occurs entirely within the language
of revelation. In the Christian revelation God's living Word provides, with its
own disclosure, the conditions for the internal justification of its truth. The Spirit
given with, and in, the Word testifies to the veracity of the message and enables
the believer to see its evidence. But a justification of this nature is neither
available nor sufficient to modem philosophy. The idea of a divine revelation,
far from providing the justifying evidence which disclosure requires, has itself
come to stand in dire need of support. Nor should we assume, as Gadamer does
(in analogy with the way revelation justifies itself to the believing mind), that
language justifies its own disclosure. Because the disclosure of language by itself
provides no adequate criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood-an essential
task in the traditional justification of truth.
One particular characteristic of the disclosure of faith appears to exclude the
kind of objective, impartial justification on which philosophy insists for the
legitimation of truth. This disclosure does not consist in a detached intellectual
insight but requires an involved participation which philosophy cannot, and
should not, reproduce. Phenomenologists experienced this when they attempted
to apply to the religious disclosure Husserl's epoche-the bracketing of all
existential elements needed to bring the phenomenon to its pure "essential"
appearance. Is a method devised for grasping the object as it appears in the
immanence of the experience qualified to bring out the transcendence of that
object? How can phenomenology preserve the unique transcendence of what the
religious act intends? The doxic modality of faith affects not only the real
(empirical) experience of the act but also the ideal (i.e., independently of the
psychological conditions of the experience) status of its object. The religious act
intends its object as lying essentially beyond the immanence of the experience.
One may well wonder, then, whether the phenomenological method, restricted
as it is to the ideal immanence of that object suffices for justifying the truth of
the disclosure. Unlike other acts of consciousness faith never brings its intentional
object to full immanence. Its object is experienced as lying beyond attainment,
and its only immanence in the experience consists in the very awareness of a
lasting transcendence.
Two prominent students of the phenomenology of religion, Gerardus Van der
Leeuw and Max Scheler, therefrom concluded that the religious act and its intentional object cannot be understood unless one shares the faith that conditions them,
that is, unless one accepts the transcendence of its object. 16 Clearly, if this implied
the need to convert philosophy into faith, philosophy would eo ipso cease to justify
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the religious disclosure altogether. Yet according to another, milder interpretation,
an adequate philosophical evaluation of religious disclosure would require only
that the critic be in some way directly acquainted with its experience. This acquaintance need not consist in a full participation in the faith on which one reflects: it may
be no more than the memory of an actual faith, or even no specific faith at all, but
only a personal acquaintance with the religious experience in general. Even so, the
restriction prevents philosophical reflection on the religious disclosure from being
universally available. But can a reflection not generally accessible be called philosophical? Does "a truth" that cannot justify itself on a universal basis still be considered philosophically justified at all? Before answering these questions negatively, we should realize that the aesthetic experience falls under the same restrictions. Only a person actually acquainted with such an experience qualifies for
passing philosophical judgment on it. Rather than to claim that there is no truth in
the disclosure of art and religion one should conclude that the truth of disclosure,
aesthetic or religious, intrinsically differs from scientific or historical truth, even
though they may share some rules. But this much remains certain: religion introduces its own truth without allowing itself to be measured definitively by any
extrinsic or universal norm.
Other, perhaps equally fundamental difficulties have emerged from the attempts
to apply to religion the disclosure theory of truth as formulated by Heidegger.
Theologians sympathetic to his distinction between Being (Sein) and beings
(Seiende) have not succeeded in defining the place of God in his structure. Is God
Being itself, or a being? I doubt whether the issue can be resolved on Heidegger's
terms. Whether a particular theory of disclosure fits the religious case, depends
very much on the mode in which it is conceived. Heidegger's disclosure clearly
differs from, and is possibly incompatible with, the Judaeo-Christian religious disclosure. The problem exceeds the linguistic aptitude of Greek concepts for articulating ideas mainly expressed in Hebrew concepts. When Rudolf Bultmann interpreted religious truth as existential disclosure, his superior knowledge of the
Jewish background of Christianity succeeded in neutralizing, at least in part, the
Hellenic orientation of Heidegger's theory. No, the more fundamental problem
lies in the very assumption that the Gospel can be exhaustively translated into
existential terms. Kierkegaard with his own intense interest in an existential
realization of the Gospel remained acutely aware of the ultimate incongruity
between transcendent meaning and immanent existence and therefore considered
all genuinely religious truth to remain permanently hidden from direct communication. Religious truth is, indeed, interiorly disclosed, but never directly. It
remains, as Kierkegaard put it, a "pathetic-dialectical" message that is, one which
after having been passively received, must still be dialectically interiorized. This
translation into existence, essential to the religious disclosure, consists in a
never-ending process of mediation.
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The self-manifestation of the transcendent is, in the end, neither self-understanding nor understanding of Being. Though contributing to both, it also surpasses
them in referring to the inexpressible. Mystical writers have fully accepted this
paradox. John of the Cross introduces his chapter on "naked truths" with the disconcerting preface: "You should know, beloved reader, that what they in themselves
are for the soul is beyond words. "17 He then proceeds by declaring the knowledge
of God a subject on which "in no way anything can be said. "18 Nor is this inexpressible knowledge "manifest and clear," but "sublime" because "transcending what
is naturally attainable. "19 These paradoxes of mystical knowledge affect religious
truth as such: it discloses what can never be fully disclosed. Without accounting for
this unique mode of religious disclosing a philosophical theory of truth as disclosure, far from "justifying" religious truth, remains incapable of understanding it.
Religious disclosure conveys a truth that, in its essentials, refuses to submit
to external criteria. To confirm this conclusion we only have to reflect on the
notion of experience as religion uses it. Any disclosure takes place in some mode
of what we vaguely refer to as experience. Now, if experience means no more
than the various mental processes by which a person, actively and passively,
responds to the stimuli of his or her life world, the term contains no brief for
truth. Yet if, as Aristotle taught,2° experience yields a unique form of insight
that, though not scientific, nevertheless attains a kind of cumulative and never
completed universality, then it is at least on the way to truth. Experience defines
its own meaning: the person who experiences learns in the process itself what
he or she is experiencing. This insight cannot claim the title of truth, however,
until, beyond a mere empirical awareness, it attains some form of ideal necessity
and thereby discloses a permanent feature of the real as such. Yet the truth of
experience does not lie exclusively in its possible result, the knowledge, for
which it establishes the precondition, but also, and primarily as Gadamer points
out, in the process itself. 21 Precisely in following the very course of consciousness
in time experience acquires its unique purchase on truth, namely, that it is and
becomes increasingly my own experience. It hereby endows truth, on whichever
level acquired, with some kind of practical indubitability which, though not
warranting freedom from error, nevertheless secures unsubstitutional evidence.
Now religious disclosure occurs within a highly personal or intensely communal
experience and, even when raised to the level of full and universal truth, retains
this personal or communal quality in being a truth-far-me or a truth-for-us.
Revelation discloses as much about the believer as it reveals of God: in it a
transcendent message interacts with an immanent experience. This tight link
between the message and the experience does not render religious disclosure a
purely subjective affair. The reality which we experience, in this case the transcendent reality as communicated in revelation, defines the nature ofthe experience
and endows it with its own authority-not the other way round. 22
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This, however, by no means implies that in the immanence of his experience
the believer gains direct access to the transcendent object received by it. The
experience of faith does not convey the kind of meaning fulfillment whereby
other modes of thought render their object "personally" present. God never
appears in the manner in which a sense object bodily presents itself, or in which
the solution to a mathematical problem suddenly forces its incontrovertible evidence upon the mind." Nonetheless faith carries an evidence of its own which,
without the manifest presence of its object, illuminates the believer's relation to
it as vital to the understanding of itself and of all reality. The experience of
revelation draws the decisive arguments for verifying its content not from external
sources, but from itself. Believers assume that what they know of the divine
object they know through that object itself. Christians have traditionally expressed
this in the doctrine of the indwelling Spirit who teaches them "the entire faith."
Eckhart echoed it in his word that the eye with which we see God is the eye
with which He sees Himself. Clearly this kind of evidence provides no scientific
support for its truth, nor does it lend greater coherence to our empirical observation
of the world. Neither does it provide metaphysical insight. But it opens up a
different perspective on metaphysical insight as well as on empirical investigation,
and brings with it a unique yet highly personal evidence of its own truth. 24
Yale University
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